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This article starts an engagement on the aesthetics of experiments and offers an 
account for analysing how aesthetics features in the design, evaluation and reception of 
experiments. I identify two dimensions of aesthetic evaluation of experiments: design 
and significance. When it comes to design, a number of qualities, such as simplicity, 
economy and aptness, are analysed and illustrated with the famous Meselson-Stahl 
experiment. Beautiful experiments are also regarded to make significant discoveries, 
but I argue against a narrow construal of experimental aims. By drawing on the plurality 
of goals experimenters have and diversity of aesthetic responses, I argue that 
experiments are aesthetically appreciated both when they discover and when they 






Much philosophical attention has recently been given to the relationship between 
aesthetics and science. In addition to a number of collections exploring connections 
between philosophy of science and philosophy of art (Bueno et. al 2018; Frigg and 
Hunter 2010) and fiction and imagination in science (Levy and Godfrey-Smith 2020), 
recently an entire volume was dedicated exploring the role of aesthetic evaluations in 
science (Ivanova and French 2020). The latter offers a number of new directions on 
how beauty affects the evaluation of scientific theories and can guide theory choice in 
cases of underdetermination, the relationship between beauty on one hand, and 
truth and/or the acquisition of understanding on the other, and experiences of the 
sublime in science. The primary focus of these works has been scientific theories and 
their aesthetic value. However, there is also a very productive engagement emerging 
that focuses on scientific practices beyond the theory, and exploring their aesthetic 
dimensions. For instance, Wiley (2015, 2021), Turner (2019) and Currie (2020) offer 
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illuminating studies of aesthetic factors operating in the preparation of fossils in 
palaeontology, Parsons (2012) explores how aesthetic factors affects the study of 
proteins in chemical biology, Ambrosio and Clarke (2018) study aesthetics in anatomy, 
while Elgin (2014) and Murphy (2020) discuss the aesthetic nature of thought 
experiments by drawing analogies to literary works. While the philosophical 
engagement on the relationship between science and aesthetics is blooming, there 
seems to be a significant gap in the current literature when it comes to another 
important aspect of scientific activity: the experiment. Such an absence of 
philosophical attention to the aesthetic nature of experimentation seems hard to 
justify since, like theories, experiments are regarded as having aesthetic properties, as 
being beautiful, and to generate aesthetic responses. Experiments also play a crucial 
role in the exploration of phenomena and target systems, establishing the tenability 
of theories, discovering new phenomena, entities, techniques and experimental 
methods. Given their significance, it is crucial to ask whether aesthetic factors play 
any interesting roles in scientific experimentation. This article aims to fill this gap by 
offering a new framework for analysing the aesthetic significance of experiments and 
identifying a number of important questions for the further advancement of this 
literature. I show how aesthetic judgements feature in the design, appraisal and 
reception of an experiment and defend the cognitive value of aesthetic judgements in 
experimentation.  
 
I start section 2 with an overview of the current literature on the aesthetics of 
science, outlining a number of questions that have received systematic attention, 
such as whether we should take the aesthetic discourse that occurs in science 
seriously, what constitutes beauty in science, whether aesthetic values are stable or 
changing, and whether they can play any epistemic roles in science. After drawing this 
literature map, in section 3 I turn to defining what constitutes a beautiful experiment, 
identifying a number of contenders concerned with the design of the experiment, 
such as its elegance, simplicity, economy and aptness: how well it was designed to 
serve its purpose. I illustrate this account with a case study from molecular biology, 
the famous Meselson-Stahl experiment, often referred to as ‘the most beautiful 
experiment in biology’. Having analysed the design aspect of aesthetic appreciation of 
experiments, in section 4 I focus on the aesthetic appreciation of their results. I argue 
that when addressing the question of whether an experiment is beautiful, we need to 
draw a distinction between design and significance, both of which have been the 
subject of aesthetic praise by scientists. I defend a pluralistic approach to 
experimentation and aesthetic value, arguing that experiments are aesthetically 
valuable both when they confirm or discover and when they produce probing results. 
I conclude that both the design of an experiment and its results should be considered 
when analysing the aesthetic value of an experiment and that aesthetic appreciation 
plays an important cognitive role in science.  
 
2. Aesthetics and Science: the state of the art  
 
Aesthetics features prominently in scientific engagement. We can identify several 
levels at which aesthetic considerations and judgements enter in scientific activities. 
The subject of our investigations, nature itself, affords us aesthetic experiences. 
Scientists often claim that nature is beautiful and refer to specific phenomena, such 
as microscopic cell structures, rainbows, honeycombs, stalagmites, as beautiful, as 
generating in us feelings of awe and wonder2. Products of scientific activities are also 
aesthetically appraised. Pictures of oscillating particles, scientific models like the 
structure of DNA molecules, mathematical proofs like Euclid’s Elements, experiments 
like Rutherford’s explorations of uranium radiation, and many scientific theories, from 
Newton’s and Einstein’s theories of gravity, to the standard model and evolutionary 
theory, are claimed to be aesthetically valuable and beautiful. Furthermore, the 
process by which scientists arrive at a product, whether constructing a proof or an 
experiment or arriving at a theory, is considered analogous to an artistic production 
subject to aesthetic judgement. Scientists, like artists, are praised for their creative 
and imaginative thinking and use of their aesthetic sensibility, with the French 
physicist Pierre Duhem arguing that: 
 
[I]t is impossible to follow the march of one of the great theories of physics, to 
see it unroll majestically its regular deductions starting from initial hypotheses, 
to see its consequences represent a multitude of experimental laws down to 
the small detail, without being charmed by the beauty of such a construction, 
without feeling keenly that such a creation of the human mind is truly a work of 
art (Duhem 1954, 24). 
 
Ernest Rutherford similarly reflects that theories can be seen as artistic productions: 
“a strong claim can be made that the process of scientific discovery may be regarded 
as a form of art. […] A well constructed theory is in some respects undoubtedly an 
artistic production.” (quoted in McAllister 1996, 14).  
 
It is clear that aesthetic judgements feature in all these levels of scientific practice but 
what role do they play? During the logical positivist tradition, aesthetic considerations 
were deemed only relevant in the context of discovery. Since they were regarded as 
subjective, aesthetic considerations were given no bearing in the context of 
justification, which involves the formal relationship between the theory and the 
evidence. More recent studies on the nature of observation, evidence and practice 
more generally have challenged the demarcation between these two phases of 
scientific development, with arguments defending the involvement of aesthetic 
judgements in the construction and evaluation of evidence as well (Celluci (2015), 
French (2020), Ivanova and French (2020) and Wiley (2021)). An alternative line of 
scepticism has been expressed by Todd (2008), who challenges the idea that the 
aesthetic judgements we see in science are indeed of aesthetic nature, given the 
difficulty in defining the nature of the aesthetic response, and claiming that aesthetic 
judgements are ultimately concealed epistemic judgements. However, two lines of 
arguments have been offered to motivate taking scientist’s aesthetic judgements 
seriously. First, against the idea that beauty claims about scientific products are 
reducible to claims about their empirical success, we run into the problem that often 
theories, for instance, are judged to be beautiful when they lack evidential support. 
																																																								
2 Different accounts have been proposed regarding the aesthetic appreciation of nature. For a 
detailed discussion see Carlson (2011), Parsons (2002) and Turner (2019).  
Such is the case in modern physics, where it is becoming progressively hard to test 
theories in high-energy domains, and physicists appeal more and more to aesthetic 
arguments to support their beliefs in the theory (Ivanova (2020)). Furthermore, as we 
will see in more detail below, we also often attribute aesthetic value to theories that 
are not epistemically successful. For instance we appreciate the beauty of the Kaluza-
Klein theory even if it is not an empirically successful theory. Second, there seems to 
be some empirical evidence from neuroscience suggesting that the cognitive 
processes unfolding during the aesthetic appreciation of artworks is the same as that 
involving appreciation of scientific products, giving us at least some motivation to 
explore the common nature of aesthetic appreciation of artworks and scientific 
products (Ivanova 2017a).  
 
Those that have taken scientists’ aesthetic judgements literally have been occupied 
with two central questions: (1) what is the nature of aesthetic judgements in science: 
are they stable or changing?; and (2) what kind of role do these judgements play in 
science, are they motivational or cognitive? Starting with the latter question, it has 
been argued that aesthetic judgements in science are of purely motivational nature, 
with the famous mathematician Henri Poincaré claiming that “[t]he scientist does not 
study nature because it is useful to do so. He studies it because he takes pleasure in 
it, and he takes pleasure in it because it is beautiful” (2001, 368). Beyond its 
motivational role, some give beauty a much more substantial role in their reasoning, 
arguing that aesthetically valuable theories are more likely to be true. Take, for 
instance, Paul Dirac’s claim that the beauty of general relativity was what motivated 
his trust in the theory before it was empirically supported: “one has a great 
confidence in the theory arising from its great beauty, quite independently of its 
detailed successes” (Dirac 1980, 40). Dirac’s sentiments are certainly not unusual. A 
number of scientists have defended such a link, with the Nobel Laureate 
Chandrasekhar, offering a series of arguments in his book Beauty and Truth, showing 
the historical relationship between beautiful theories and their truthlikeness.  
 
How has such a link between truth and beauty been justified? A long-standing 
tradition, going back to Robert Boyle and Isaac Newton, has it that nature is beautiful, 
simple, well-ordered, so the beauty of our theories simply reflects the beauty of 
nature. More recently, empirical arguments have been advanced that take the track 
record of theories with aesthetic properties and infer that these properties can justify 
our trust in contemporary theories. Scientific realists, for instance, have argued that 
virtues such as simplicity, unity and economy can be used to evaluate the plausibility 
of a theory when the evidence is not yet available to support it. Richard Boyd (1984) 
argues that theories possessing theoretical virtues that have been instantiated by 
previously successful theories will be ranked as more plausible while Wesley Salmon 
(1990) goes further in showing how these virtues can bear upon the confirmation of a 
theory by showing that the past record of success will ultimately determine the prior 
probability of a theory. Such track record argument, involving the aesthetic values of 
theories, is also developed by James McAllister (1996), although the focus of his work 
is not to defend scientific realism and the relationship between beauty and truth, but 
to argue for the rational employment of aesthetic factors in the evaluation and 
adoption of a theory. The underlying idea is that we can extract which aesthetic 
qualities have been associated with historically successful theories and rationally 
employ new theories that possess these qualities too.  
 
There is, however, also scepticism with regard to such track record arguments. Sabine 
Hossenfelder (2018) discusses a number of illuminating examples from theoretical 
physics in which theories of great aesthetic merit are abandoned due to their lack of 
predictive success, such as steady state universe, Platonic solids, Kaluza-Klein theory. 
Hossenfelder argues that we should proceed with care when it comes to beauty 
guiding our belief in theories, because beauty can often be a systematic bias that 
leads away from developing successful theories. And when it comes to placing 
confidence in the track record of ‘ugly’ theories, our current best theories in physics – 
the standard model and quantum mechanics – provide examples of great empirical 
and predictive success but are rarely used as examples of beautiful theories, quite the 
contrary. In a similar manner, Ivanova (2020) argues that track record arguments are 
inconclusive, since both ‘optimistic’ and ‘pessimistic’ arguments can be supported 
from the history of science.  
 
More recently, we have seen a shift in the debate on the aim of science, with some 
now focusing on understanding rather than truth as the primary goal of science. This 
shift of philosophical attention has been motivated by the observation that science 
often achieves understanding by utilising highly abstracted and idealised models that 
depart from what our best scientific theories tell is to be true about the world 
(Potochnick (2018), Elgin (2018)). In this context, beauty has been seen to play a 
regulative role with Breitenbach (2013), Elgin (2020), and Ivanova (2017a, 2017b, 
2020) arguing that aesthetic values shape and guide our investigations and epistemic 
goals. 
 
A further question that has occupied philosophers concerns the concept of beauty 
itself. If we were to place epistemic import on such a concept, shouldn’t it be 
objective and rigid? The debate here concerns whether beauty can in any sense be 
seen to be an objective or stable concept, with many arguing that our aesthetic 
judgements differ among individuals, schools of thought and time periods. McAllister, 
for instance, argues that theory change can be understood as revolutions at the level 
of aesthetic values, arguing that beauty in science, very much like in art, is a dynamic 
and ever changing concept, with new aesthetic values taking over past ones. Despite 
such instability of aesthetic judgements in the history of science, McAllister ties 
beauty to utility and argues that it is rational to rely on aesthetic values despite their 
dynamicism, because aesthetic values are ultimately grounded in empirical success. 
However, not everyone is convinced about the revolutions of our aesthetic values in 
science, with some philosophers claiming that there is continuity when it comes to 
the core values employed in science. Peter Kivy (1991), for instance, observes that 
scientists consistently praise classic features and Ullian Montano (2012) further 
argues that some aesthetic values, such as simplicity and elegance, are ‘historical 
constants’, not losing centrality in scientific practice. This resistance to revise 
aesthetic canons and the stability of values such as economy, elegance, simplicity and 
symmetry, has been explained as reflecting facts about humans’ cognitive capacities 
and other practical constraints, that make these values central to scientific practice 
(Ivanova (2020)). 
 
What we see in this fruitful engagement so far is an emphasis on scientific theorising, 
and the epistemic goods aesthetic values might be related to. But scientific 
engagement is a lot richer and it is important to explore at what other levels we can 
find aesthetic considerations operating in the practices of science. I thus hope that by 
exploring the aesthetic dimensions of experimental practice, we can shed some 
further light onto how we can address the above questions, especially when it comes 
to identifying whether we see different aesthetic appraisal during different 
experimental traditions, and how aesthetic values shape the design and reception of 
experiments. My aim in the next section is to focus on the concept of beauty in 
scientific experiments and ask (1) what constitutes a beautiful experiment?, and (2) 
how aesthetic considerations shape the experiment?.  
 
3. Beauty in design: on the simplicity, economy and elegance of experiments  
 
Experiments have been praised for their aesthetic qualities from the early days of the 
Royal Society, where natural philosophers would perform experiments in front of 
audiences and would often report the experience of delight, awe and beauty. Joseph 
Priestley, for one, notes in his studies on electric phenomena that experiments on 
electric currents are “one of the most beautiful experiments” generating “the most 
delightful spectacle” (1775, 298). The focus of aesthetic appreciation during this time 
often concerns the unveiling of a beautiful natural phenomenon via the experiment. 
Although the instruments and materials used in the experiment, as well as the steps 
implemented of the experiment, were also acknowledged as beautiful, skilful and 
showing originality and creativity of the experimenter, the experiment was seen as a 
way to display nature’s beauty. What receives particular attention at this time is the 
observed phenomenon, the beauty of the electric effect, giving rise to the experience 
of pleasure, awe, amusement (ibid., 504-506).3 Alexander Wragge-Morley’s recent 
(2020) study of the aesthetic considerations driving the members of the Royal Society 
in this period is instructive. He documents the aesthetic considerations at the 
forefront of natural philosophers, from the preparation of specimens, the design of 
experiments, the formulation of hypothesis and emphasises that these practices were 
deeply impacted by the belief that nature itself is beautiful, which in itself was 
grounded in the belief of a divine creator. For instance, Hooke’s Micrographia (1665) 
illustrates the idea that simply reproducing the data of experience (the specimens) 
was considered unsatisfactory, that one had to provoke a feeling of pleasure and 
beauty when looking at the scientific object, thus producing a beautiful image. 
																																																								
3  Defining an experience as aesthetic in nature and delineating it clearly from other 
experiences has been a difficult task. Noël Carroll (2002) distinguishes between axiological, 
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identify common qualities in the object generating the experience, while the affect approach 
focuses on the qualities of the experience itself (see Beardsley (1982) for an affect oriented 
definition). For the purposes of this article, I will grant that there is an aesthetic experience 
without committing to a particular definition.   
Examples of the artistic presentation of the object of scientific investigations are 
illustrated in the work of Hooke’s depiction of the flea as seen under the microscope, 
and Leonardo Da Vinci’s presentation of the human body in his sketches, to name a 
few.  
 
Parsons and Reuger (2000) have argued that methodological shifts during the 18th 
century correlate with a shift in the aesthetic appreciation of experiments. While 
earlier experiments aim to study nature and were repeatedly performed following the 
inductive method, shifting to the hypothetico-deductive method directs towards 
experiments serving the purpose of testing the correctness of theories. As Parsons 
and Reuger argue: 
 
[N]ow it is only with the assistance of the confirmed or illustrated theory that an 
experiment is thought to give us insight into nature. Whatever beauty is 
displayed in an experiment, it cannot be the beauty of nature itself; the 
economy of an experiment reflects the economy of our own cognitive 
households, not the economy of nature. This is clearly different from the view 
of the eighteen century natural philosopher who appreciates nature itself 
through the frame of the experiment. (ibid., 411) 
 
Parsons and Reuger appeal to Allen Carlson’s (1993) distinction between order-
oriented and design-oriented appreciation, a distinction they take to reflect the two 
modes of appreciations we see in the early 17-18th century and the later 18-19th 
century traditions. What comes to be aesthetically appreciated in the later tradition is 
not nature’s beauty itself, but the display of “‘aptness’ in the relation of result and 
tools, of plan and success” (ibid., 411). The experiment is now beautiful because it is 
“optimally suited to achieve its purpose” (ibid., 411-412). So what kinds of qualities 
receive attention in the experiments after this shift?  
 
Aesthetic appraisal of experiments seems to focus on the simplicity, elegance, and 
aptness of the experiments. For instance, in his reflections on Ernst Rutherford’s 
experiments on the artificial disintegration of atomic nuclei, Pyoter Kapitsa focuses on 
the simplicity of the experiments. He claims that these experiments are “exceptionally 
simple” (1937, 90) and that “any researcher, and not a physicist alone, cannot help 
but be astonished by this simplicity of the posing of the question, by the most simple 
experiment. Such simplicity can come only from a genius, particularly when it leads to 
such striking results” (ibid., 91). Similar remarks can be found about Owen 
Richardson’s study of the electron, which Peter Galison describes as a ‘simple’ and 
‘elegant’ series of experiments (1980, 32). Even in the case of thought experiments, 
simplicity and aptness seem to be at the forefront of appreciation. Brown, for 
instance, argues that Galileo’s thought experiment on falling bodies is “the most 
beautiful thought experiment” due to its simplicity and originality (2004, 24). And 
while one might worry about the status of thought experiments, whether they are 
genuine experiments or not 4  (and we should certainly note that the materials 
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employed between thought experiments and physical experiments are different), the 
emphasis on aesthetic praise in both domains seems to be on the economy of the 
design.  
 
So far I have argued that while there are clearly many experiments that offer visually 
pleasing features, which can be due to observing a beautiful natural phenomenon or 
even the experimental instruments and tools, the ultimate beauty of experiments lies 
in their design and significance. Experiments are beautiful because of the simplicity, 
elegance, economy and aptness of their design, showing the creative and imaginative 
thinking of the experimenters. To illustrate this, I now explore in more depth the 
reception of one particular experiment, often referred to as ‘the most beautiful 
experiment in biology’, the famous experiment by Matthew Meselson and Franklin 
Stahl that determined how DNA replicates5. Meselson and Stahl aimed to understand 
the process by which the DNA replicates, a question that became central after the 
discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA in 1953. Three different hypotheses 
were proposed: (1) conservative replication, proposed by Gunther Stent, according to 
which each of the two strands of the parent DNA molecule are replicated in the new; 
(2) semi-conservative replication, proposed by James Watson and Francis Crick, 
according to which one strand of the parent DNA is conserved in the daughter DNA; 
and (3) dispersive replication, proposed by Max Delbrück, suggesting that the parent 
DNA chains break at intervals, with the parental segments combining with new 
segments to form the daughter DNA.  
 
In 1958 Meselson and Stahl published the results of an experiment they performed a 
year earlier that is broadly regarded to have conclusively supported the semi-
conservative replication and discredited the alternative hypotheses. Meselson and 
Stahl fed bacteria nutrients containing heavy nitrogen isotope that through 
																																																																																																																																																														
experiments. Morgan (2005) argues for the superiority and epistemic privilege of physical 
experiments over models and simulations on two grounds: (1) materiality requirement states 
that we can learn more about a target system that is made of the same stuff as the 
experiment, and the latter allows to intervene into nature while a simulation does not; and 
(2) only experiments can produce surprising results, privileging them over models and 
simulations. In contrast, Norton and Suppe (2001) argue that models and simulations are just 
another form of experiments. Parker (2009) challenges the materiality requirement, arguing 
that simulations are genuine experiments and can give us knowledge of target systems on 
which physical experiments are not possible, such as climate and economic models. Parke 
(2014) further challenges the idea that experiments hold epistemic privilege over simulations, 
showing that materiality is often not the relevant aspect that can reveal knowledge about the 
target system. In addition, Brown (1986) suggests that like physical experiments, thought 
experiments allow us to discover new knowledge. And when it comes to the argument from 
surprise, Currie (2018) shows that simulations can produce productively surprising results and 
French and Murphy (forthcoming)) further show that thought experiments can also surprise 
us in productive ways. In this paper I adopt a pluralist approach to experiments.     
5 Here I focus on how the experiment has been received and praised by scientists and 
historians, for a detailed analysis of the experiment itself and the inferences drawn from the 
obtained results, see Bateu (2019), Franklin and Laymon (2020), Holmes (2008) and Weber 
(2019). 
 
metabolising is incorporated into the bacterial genetic material. They continued the 
process until the genetic material of the bacteria became heavy. Then they fed the 
bacteria light nitrogen and studied the genetic material of the bacteria through the 
next generations. Using ultracentrifugation to separate light from heavy genetic 
material, they obtained ratios of light heavy and hybrid DNA compatible with the 
semi-conservative replication. They obtained a band of intermediate density in the 
first generation, while a combination of intermediate density and light density 
followed in the next generation. The results were seen to disconfirm the conservative 
and dispersive replication hypothesis, since the former predicts only light and heavy 
DNA in the next generations, while the latter entails only intermediate density DNA 
(Holmes (2008)).  
 
The scientific community has praised this experiment for its beauty, but what is it 
about it that is beautiful? If we look in the scientific community for answers, we find a 
range of responses when it comes to the aesthetic evaluation and reception of this 
experiment, which I classify into two categories: (1) the design of the experiment: 
elegant, simple, apt and original; and (2) simple, clear, conclusive, important results. 
Let us explore these aspects in more detail.  
 
Starting with the significance of the design, one aspect that has been noted is the 
elegant and original idea behind how Meselson and Stahl set up the experiment. For 
instance, Ernst Peter Fischer argues that: 
 
One condition of this experiment consisted in making the genetic material 
physically heavier without changing it chemically. There is something beautiful in 
this idea alone, the understanding that the chemical properties of an atom—for 
example, its ability to bond with other atoms—are determined by its external 
electrons, whereas the physical properties—for example, the mass—are hidden 
inside the atomic nucleus. (1999, 21) 
 
This consideration regards the elegance and aptness of the experiment, the 
experimenters setting up the experiment in the most optimal way to obtain the 
results. Holmes also praises the simplicity of this experiment, arguing that the simple 
steps of the experiment and its results make it ideal for pedagogical purposes:  
 
The beauty of the Meselson-Stahl experiment is invariably connected with its 
simplicity. When reduced to its essential features, it is readily understood even 
by beginning students of the life sciences. Teachers look on it with fondness for 
the ease with which its message can be conveyed (2001, ix).  
 
Holmes notes that many scientists praise the simplicity of this experiment because it 
is easy to explain it to students, it is easily visualised, the steps are easy to grasp, and 
the results and significance of the experiment are easy to appreciate (ibid., 427). 
Holmes argues that the Meselson-Stahl experiment is seen as a model experiment 
and is regularly used when teaching introduction to molecular biology.  
 
Another feature pertaining to the aptness and originality of this experiment is the use 
of centrifugation in extraction of the genetic material. This step in the experiment 
shows innovative design and was widely regarded as beautiful. Throughout the 
history of science we have praised the creative thinking behind the novel involvement 
of methods, techniques and instruments fitting for the purpose of the experimenter. 
Studies of the vacuum utilised the newly invented air pump, the interferometer was 
an invention aimed to enable measurement of the velocity of the earth relative to the 
ether; currently we use complex technologies and machine learning algorithms in 
modern experiments in physics, ecology, medicine both to obtain, process and find 
significant results. Similarly, with the use of centrifugation Messelson and Stahl 
resolved a difficulty about experimental studies on DNA at the time, they employed a 
highly suitable way of labelling the DNA strands, which was original and innovative. 
The important point to stress is that the involvement of innovation, creativity and 
imagination of the experimenter themselves is inherently related to the aptness of 
the design. 
 
Another important feature of the Meselson-Stahl experiment is the significance of its 
results, we often find scientists arguing that the results were ‘clean’ and ‘solid’, the 
experiment is seen to be an exemplar of a crucial experiment, confirming one 
hypothesis while disconfirming its competitors (Franklin and Laymon (2020), Weber 
(2019)). Franklin and Laymon (2020) and Holmes (2008) argue that the results are so 
clear and immediate, there was no need for replication, they spoke conclusively in 
defence of semi-conservative replication. Stahl himself notes that the results exhibit 
notable clarity in the sense that there is no need for their interpretation, they exhibit 
a sense of completeness and conclusiveness. 6  Fischer further adds that “the 
Meselson-Stahl experiments speak for themselves and made all further commentary 
superfluous” (1999, 21). 
 
If we go back to the central debates in the contemporary literature on aesthetics in 
science, outlined in section 2, we can ask whether judgements about experimental 
design are stable across different time periods, or whether they are dynamic. From 
our discussions so far it is clear that experimental practice has certainly changed, so 
perhaps we can expect the aesthetic values associated with such practices to change 
too. The table-top experiments performed by natural philosophers were rather 
simple and their results immediately perceived by the senses, they involved relatively 
cheap equipment and were performed by one scientist. In contrast, today large-scale 
experiments are designed and run by international communities and involve highly 
complex machinery. Does this mean experiments at different experimental periods 
are appreciated differently? I think some aspects of aesthetic appreciation of 
experiments have certainly changed and this reflects the diversity of experimental set 
ups. For instance, experiments today hardly involve immediately perceiving the 
results and they certainly lack the performative dimension on 17th century 
																																																								
6 Tudor Baetu (2020) however challenges the idea that the results spoke so clearly in favour 
of the semi-conservative replication arguing that some of the auxiliary assumptions made by 
the experimenters needed to receive further support, making the conservative hypothesis 
still a viable option at the time Meselson and Stahl published and result, condemning it only 
after further experiments were carried out.  
experiments. However, I also think there is scope to consider aptness and economy in 
design as relevant aspects of appreciation in today’s experiments just as in those 
experiments in different experimental periods, even if there are differences in how 
these design aspects are manifested. Despite the complexity of modern experiments, 
the materials and steps involved in their design, central aspect of appreciation 
remains how well the experiment is designed for purpose and whether it is optimal. 
This preference for economy and aptness can be seen as a product of cognitive and 
material limitations, ultimately shaping our aesthetic appreciation for the design that 
most economically achieves a purpose (Ivanova (2020)).   
 
So far we have explored aspects of the experiments pertaining to design. But as noted 
earlier, beautiful experiments do not only exhibit pleasing design, they also do 
something significant: they discover, confirm. What does this imply for the question 
at hand: is an experiment beautiful only when it is successful? Answering this 
question is the focus of the next section.  
 
4. From design to significance: on the diversity of experimental aims  
 
In the last section we saw that one aspects for which the Meselson-Stahl experiment 
has received the status of ‘the most beautiful experiment in biology’ regards the 
significance of its results. The experiment is often regarded as an example of a crucial 
experiment, even by those who acknowledge the Duhemian worries behind the 
concept7. The significance of the results, their ability to speak decisively in favour of 
one hypothesis over alternatives, is a significant aspect of aesthetic praise for this 
experiment. Similar focus on the significance of the results has been noted by Crease 
(2002), who discusses a number of beautiful experiments in science that do not only 
exemplify good design but also achieve significant results: they extend our knowledge 
by discovering new particles or confirming a scientific theory. In this section I focus on 
the questions: (1) how do we understand the significance of a scientific experiment?; 
and (2) is focusing on discovery or confirmation doing justice to the plurality of 
experimental aims in conducting an experiment? I then proceed to defend a 
pluralistic approach to experiments and argue that experiments can elicit a number of 
different aesthetic responses.  
 
Let us start with the idea about the immediateness of the obtained results. Holmes 
argues that the Meselson-Stahl experiment obtains the results in an immediate sense, 
claiming that the experiment was constituted by a ‘singular historical event’, observed 
by the individual scientist, it was not repeated afterwards (2008, 431). This is an 
																																																								
7 Pierre Duhem (1906) challenges the idea that experiments can conclusively speak in favor of 
a theory we test or decisively condemn it, due to the holistic nature of theory testing. Since 
out hypotheses are always tested together with a number of other theories and assumptions 
employed in the set up of the experiment, an anomalous result could indicate fault in the 
hypothesis we test or in the other assumptions. The logical structure of the reasoning here 
does not allow us to discriminate where the fault lies. Solutions to Duhem’s problem have 
been discussed by Dietrich and Honenberger (2020) and Ivanova (2021a). When it comes to 
the Meselson-Stahl experiment, Weber (2019) argues that despite the seriousness of 
Duhem’s problem, this is a case of a crucial experiment in science.   
important observation, but Holmes himself recognises that many experiments in 
science will not exhibit such simplicity and immediateness of the obtained results8. 
We certainly do not expect results to have such immediateness in experiments in 
high-energy physics, for instance, where the experiment stretches over the borders of 
countries, involves thousands of scientists, and the analysis of the obtained data is a 
timely and laborious process. Experiments in the Large Hadron Collider at Cern, for 
instance, lack ‘immediateness’, because analysing the outcome of a measurement is a 
complex process of statistical analysis and deciding whether the experimental data 
constitutes an ‘event’ takes time to settle (Beauchemin’s (2017)). If we take, for 
instance, one of the most recent discoveries in particle physics, the discovery of the 
Higgs boson, we can appreciate that there was hardly anything immediate about the 
discovery. There was a timespan of deliberations before the community decided a 
new particle had been detected, as Mättig and Stöltzner (2019) have nicely 
documented, with the community carefully announcing that ‘a Higgs-like particle’ had 
been detected. All this is to say that many experiments will not exhibit such clear, 
immediate results as in the case of the Meselson-Stahl experiments, and there will be 
lengthy deliberations to establish the significance of the results. Furthermore, 
contrary to earlier experiments where we get to perceive a phenomenon unfolding 
and could often appreciate the significance of the result as the experiment takes 
place, in contemporary large scale experiments we lack both immediateness and a 
sense in which we get to ‘perceive’ the results and their aesthetic qualities. While it is 
important to note that not all experiments have directly and immediately perceivable 
results, this difference is hardly surprising. After all, even in art the appreciation of 
beauty and aesthetic value more broadly is not always due to perceptual features, 
and while the aesthetic response can be immediate in some cases, it is certainly not 
necessary in the case of many artworks. Just like we need some time and work to 
appreciate the aesthetic value of a novel or a multi sensory art installation, we need 
time to appreciate the aesthetic value of a theorem, a theory or an experiment and 
its outcomes.     
 
We also need to acknowledge some of the problems surrounding the nature of 
discoveries. We can appreciate the appeal of the claim that a beautiful experiment is 
the one that leads to a discovery, given how much novelty is valued in science. As the 
sociologist Robert Merton famously observed, science is driven by the priority rule 
(Strevens (2013); we reward and praise those who discover first, leading to, among 
other things, the replication crisis (Hessen (2018)). It is no surprise, then, that even if 
two experiments exhibit the same properties, for instance they share an elegant 
design, we might still be inclined to value the one that led to the discovery, just like 
we value original painting and not their forgeries or copies. Our attribution of value to 
priority pertains to our valuing originality and creativity, which leads us to think about 
the nature of creativity and the imagination in science9. But many have challenged 
																																																								
8 As mentioned earlier, Baetu (2020) objects to the idea that the experiment produced such 
solid results, arguing rather that for the results to be solidified, further experiments were 
needed to confirm an auxiliary assumption on which the original experiments relied on. Thus, 
he sees the original results as ‘fragile’ rather than undisputable.   
9	There is an exciting recent literature on creativity and the imagination in science, see 
Anscomb (2021), Breitenbach (2020), French (2020), Hills and Bird (2018), Langland-Hassan 
our practices of credit attribution by pointing out to the plurality and contingency of 
discoveries. For instance, in his illuminating study of the discovery of positions Peter 
Galison (1982) asks ‘when was the positron discovered?’ and argues that we can 
credit three different schools that were directly responsible for the work on the 
positron. Simon Schaffer (1996) has also extensively highlighted the contingency and 
plurality behind discoveries in science, challenging our idea that our practices of 
credit attribution are justified towards those who discover first. Shaffer highlights the 
sociological and often political factors in choosing a discoverer, given the fact that 
often discoveries are made hand in hand by many scientists and groups in parallel, 
and he insightfully argues that the story of the discoverer has significance for the 
formation of institutional identity. These studies call us to reconsider the significance 
of discoveries and who is the discoverer. One interesting observation here is that 
while traditional studies of creativity have analysed it in terms of individual 
inspiration, computation, or epistemic virtue, in the context of big science and 
collaborative discoveries we are now asking whether creativity is a property or virtue 
of communities rather than individuals (Currie (2019), Ivanova and French (2020), 
Ritson (2021)). And an even more uncharted question about the nature of creativity 
and credit attribution emerges in the context of computer-assisted discoveries and 
the role of machine learning algorithms in modern scientific discoveries (Ivanova 
(forthcoming)).  
 
So far we have identified two ways in which experiments have been regarded 
beautiful due to their significance: they discover a new particle or phenomenon, or 
they confirm a hypothesis and eliminate other contenders. But while these two 
achievements are certainly important, and the focus of aesthetic appreciation, I want 
to now focus on the plurality of experimental goals and argue that we need to 
account for the diversity of experimental aims in our framework. I think that focusing 
on discovery and confirmation for attribution of aesthetic value is limiting, because 
experiments are performed with a plurality of aims in mind that go beyond the search 
to confirm a hypothesis or discover the existence of a particle or phenomenon. Some 
of these other aims include the exploration of new domains and uncovering 
phenomena that need not be accommodated within an existing theoretical 
framework. For instance, one of the aims of the LHC experiments certainly is to offer 
support to the standard model by finding a particle the theory had predicted. The 
detection of the Higgs boson in 2014 offered significant support to the standard 
model that had predicted the existence of the particle. But the aims of this 
experiment go way beyond a simple ‘tick’ against the name of the standard model. 
With these experiments, particle physicists aim to explore and study a range of 
energy never before accessible to physics, the deep TeV energy range, and these 
explorations in their turn are hoped to give insight into how we can develop physics 
beyond the standard model. This is the lesson we learn from Galison (1980), 
Cartwright (1983), Hacking (1983), Franklin (1986) and Mayo (1996): experiments 
have diversity of aims, they are not there just to check the correctness of a theory, or 
just to discover theoretically predicted particles and phenomena, they can explore 
																																																																																																																																																														
(2020), Murphy (2021), Salis and Frigg (2020), Sánchez-Dorado (2020), Shevlin (2021), and 
Stuart (2019). 	
systems without theoretical framework, and can have their own tools of judging the 
significance of the result, whether it is a genuine one of an artefact. This work sheds 
light onto the many reasons why experiments are carried out, the experimentalist 
traditions in which experiments are designed and carried out, and the ways in which 
their results are evaluated, with Galison (1980) arguing that different schools can 
reach different conclusions with regard to what an experimental result entails.. 
 
With this in mind I want to bring our attention to experimental results that are 
neither confirming nor discover in a straight-forward sense, rather, they are surprising 
and even disruptive. What can we say about their aesthetic value? Do such 
experiments have aesthetic value or do the disruptive results diminish the aesthetic 
appeal of an experiment? Take for instance the famous Michelson and Morley 
experiment designed to measure the velocity of the earth relative to the ether. 
Besides the elegant design of the experiment itself, Michelson himself created a 
highly sophisticated apparatus, the interferometer, specifically designed to achieve 
the goal of the experiment, by crafting one of the most precise instruments in the 
history of science capable of detecting very small effects. In the words of historian of 
science Gerard Holton “nobody before Michelson was able to imagine and construct 
an apparatus to measure the second-order effect of the presumed ether drift. The 
interferometer was a lovely thing” (1969, 135). When we think about the aesthetic 
dimension of this experiment, it was clearly a well-designed experiment embodying 
the imagination and creativity of the experimenters. Albert Einstein himself remarked 
that the design of the experiment made Michelson “the Artist in Science”, who 
derived joy from “the beauty of the experiment itself, and the elegance of the 
method employed” (Holton 1969, 157). However, contrary to the Messelson-Stahl 
experiment in molecular biology or the LHC detection of the Higgs boson, the 
Michelson-Morley obtained a null result. The failure to detect ether drift was a 
disruptive result that led to significant conceptual changes in physics. How can we 
understand the aesthetic significance of experiments that in a sense do not deliver on 
what they were designed to do?  
   
I think there is scope to take some such surprising and disruptive results to be part of 
a broader aesthetic experience that experiments can elicit. By recognising the 
plurality of aesthetic experiences, ranging from beauty experiences to experiences of 
awe, amusement and even sublime experiences, we can start to make sense of how 
disruptive experiments can elicit aesthetic responses. Unexpected and disruptive 
results provoke our wonder because they come in friction with our theoretical 
frameworks and ask us to reconsider out most fundamental assumptions. Sophie 
Ritson (2020) has reflected on the recent disruptive results at the LHC that caused the 
community even more excitement than the Higgs discovery, and she argues that the 
value of these results is exactly in their disruptive nature. While the results turned out 
to be fluctuations in the detector, during this time the community was forced to 
deliberate the nature of our most fundamental assumptions in particle physics. Such 
probing results do not confirm a theory or speak in favour of the existence of an 
entity, rather they are anomalous and invite further investigation, and it is in such 
further investigation and engagement that importance has been placed on the very 
nature of surprise in experimental results.  
 
The earlier discussion on the aims of the experiments ran by at the Large Hadron 
Collider at Cern is instructive to illustrate this argument. Recall that one of the goals 
of these experiments is to detect particles predicted by the standard model, this 
includes the Higgs boson as well as super symmetric particles (susy). Similarly to the 
case of the ether experiments, susy particles have not been detected at the LHC. How 
should we understand these results and their aesthetic dimension? I think we can 
accommodate the aesthetic significance of such disruptive results by adopting a 
broader perspective on the nature of aesthetic experiences. We can see the failure to 
detect susy as a disruptive result, as an invitation to reconsider not only our current 
physical theory, the standard model, but perhaps even more significantly, to question 
the very constitutive principles that have guided the development of physical theories 
in the last century – symmetry principles, naturalness and simplicity. These results are 
surprising, disruptive and valuable exactly because they do not fit our existing 
theoretical framework and thus provoke further exploration and engagement.  
 
It is with this appeal to disruptive and null results that I would like to bring us back to 
the discussion of aesthetic value of experiments. Beautiful experiments can do many 
things – they can confirm our theories, they can discover new particles, but they can 
also guide us to identify the limitations of our knowledge and probe us to further 
investigations. And the latter very much reflect the experience of awe, wonder, 
mystery and disruption that scientists often refer to when they uncover an 
unexpected or unaccounted for event. I think we can accommodate the diversity of 
roles experiments can play by adopting a broader notion of the aesthetic response. 
Just like artworks can be disruptive and break away with past artistic practices and 
traditions to invite us to reconsider our assumptions about the nature of art, artistic 
expression, the concept of beauty and the aesthetic experience, experiments can 
elicit a diversity of aesthetic responses too. Experiments can be beautiful, pleasing 
and positive and we can appreciate the aesthetic nature of the experimental results 
both when nature behaves as we expect but also when it does not, generating a 
sense of awe, surprise, mystery and wonder, even sublime experiences10 . Such 
aesthetic responses can be seen to play a cognitive role in science, since they invite us 
to identify the limitations of our knowledge and further deepen our engagement with 
the subject. We can thus account for the productive and cognitive significance of such 
disruptive or surprising results in scientific experiments and the aesthetic response 
they give rise to by recognizing the spectrum of the aesthetic responses and the 
diversity of aims experiments are designed to fulfill. As a consequence, I have argued 
that our aesthetic appreciation of experiments is due both to their design and their 
significance, and the latter can be understood more broadly to include not only 
experiments that confirm or discover but that prompt productive investigations that 
are transformative of our knowledge.    
																																																								
10 Arcangeli and Dokic (2020) have drawn an interesting analogy between the experiences of 
beauty and sublime with how we, as cognitive agents, process information. They take beauty 
experiences to be associated with fluency processing, when information is easy to process by 
fitting into previously explored patters, while the sublime experience is more disfluent, 
drawing the attention of the scientist to challenging phenomena and domains of enquiry that 
require attention for the advancement of our understanding. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
This article explored a rather neglected question in current philosophy of science: 
what constitutes a beautiful experiment? I identified two ways in which we could 
make a judgement with regard to the aesthetic value of an experiment. One is to 
identify the aesthetic value of the experiment by focusing on its design: its simplicity, 
economy, elegance and aptness. We identified a commonality between aesthetic 
praise of experiments and that of scientific theories, since the latter are also 
appreciated with the same set of values in mind, even if those are measured 
differently. However, I also argued that we do not only praise the design of an 
experiment but its significance, what the experiment helps us achieve. I defended a 
more pluralistic role for scientific experiments and argued that we can understand 
the aesthetic value of experiments that fulfil very different roles and make different 
contributions. Experiments that offer us results we expect from the start – for 
instance by detecting a particle our theory has predicted, or by offering empirical 
support for a hypothesis – do not necessarily surprise us in a probing way; they often 
align with our expectation (and that is no bad thing!). We find them beautiful for the 
same reasons we find simple and elegant theories beautiful, they are easier for us to 
work with and understand. But some experiments, that have unexpected and 
disruptive results, can trigger a different aesthetic response, more in line with our 
sense of smallness, awe and wonder. They can make us identify limitations in our 
understanding and probe us to reconsider or further develop our knowledge. Both 
are aesthetic experiences that feature in the reception of an experiment and both 
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